U.S. Housing Underwater, Securitized, and Screwed by the "Pass the Trash" Strategy
Housing-Market / US Housing Dec 15, 2009 - 01:48 AM GMTBy: Mike_Shedlock
 Calculated Risk had an interesting post last Saturday about Refinancing with Negative Equity.
Calculated Risk had an interesting post last Saturday about Refinancing with Negative Equity.
  
  His post refers to an   article written by David Streitfeld from the NY Times Interest Rates Are Low, but Banks Balk at Refinancing citing   among other things the plights of Mark Belvedere who owes $235,000 on a condo   that would sell for barely half that today, and Andrew Knapp who has tried twice   to refinance and failed. From the Times...
Mr. Belvedere said he would be willing to live with all that lost   equity if he could refinance his loan from a variable rate, which could   eventually go as high as 12 percent, into a 30-year fixed term.
    
    His   lender said no, citing the diminished value of the property. “It makes no sense   and is so frustrating,” Mr. Belvedere said. “I’m ready and willing to pay the   mortgage for the next 30 years, but they act like they’d rather have me walk   away.”
    
    Andrew Knapp, a sales executive in Bartlett, Ill., has tried twice   to refinance, which would save his family several hundred sorely needed dollars   every month. Lenders said the house had lost value and the Knapps had too much   debt. “There was no urgency for them to do anything,” Mr. Knapp said.
    
  He   has given up on the possibility of refinancing and is trying for a loan   modification. If that does not work, there is one more solution: walking away   from his home. “We’re a flight risk,” he said.
Not So Fast
    
    Calculated Risk properly   points out ...
  
Unfortunately David Streitfeld doesn't provide any further information on Belvedere's loan. If the loan was held by a bank, then it might make sense for the bank to refinance the loan (this lowers the bank's risk of default). However Belvedere's "lender" might be a servicing company and the loan may have been securitized. Then it is impossible to refinance because the current holders of the note would be paid off, and no new lender would make a loan greater than the value of the collateral.
Securitization Clues
The New York Times article digs into few pertinent facts but here are the clues the loan was securitized.
- The loan was an adjustable rate loan, one that could go as high as 12%. That smacks of subprime.
- Most adjustable rate mortgages from 2005 should have long ago adjusted dramatically lower automatically unless he was a high risk (subprime) borrower with a huge spread over the loan index.
- Nearly all subprime loans were securitized
- Adverse Selection (cherry picking) affected Prime   Loans
 
Securitizations, Cherry   Picking, and Default Rates
  
 Inquiring minds are reading a Federal   Reserve Bank of Philadelphia working paper on mortgages made between mortgages   from 2003-2007: Securitization and Mortgage Default: Reputation vs. Adverse   Selection.
The academic literature, the popular press, and policymakers have   all debated securitization’s contribution to the poor performance of   mortgages originated in the run-up to the current crisis. Theoretical arguments   have been advanced on both sides, but the lack of suitable data has made it   difficult to assess them empirically. We examine this issue by using a   loan-level data set from LPS Analytics, covering approximately three-quarters of   the mortgage market from 2003-2007, and including both securitized and   non-securitized loans.
  
  We find evidence that privately securitized loans   do indeed perform worse than similar, non-securitized loans. Moreover, this   effect is concentrated in prime mortgage markets. For example, a typical prime   ARM loan originated in 2006 becomes delinquent at a 20 percent higher rate if it   is privately securitized, ceteris paribus. By contrast, subprime loan   performance does not seem to be worse for most classes of securitized   loans.
  
  Conclusions
  
  Using a   data set that covers approximately 75 percent of loan originations from the   years 2003-2007, and that includes private securitized, GSE, and mortgages held   in portfolio, we have shown that prime private securitized loans originated at   the peak of the bubble performed significantly worse than similar,   non-securitized, loans. The results are particularly striking for markets such   as prime ARMs, in which issuers held non-negligible amounts of loans in   portfolio.
  
 This suggests that adverse selection may have been present in the   prime mortgage market, and that it may have contributed to a deterioration in   underwriting standards.
 Prime vs. Subprime Vintage 2006
  
 
As   one might expect, subprime loans were bad across the board. However, the article   states there was little difference between securitized loans and non-securitized   loans.
  
   Interestingly, securitized prime loans fare worse than   non-securitized prime loans.
  
   Investor   Type By Product
   
  
   The   above table shows how wrong it is to blame this problem entirely on "Subprime   Lending". Lending standards in general were the problem.
  
   Pass The Trash Strategy 
  
   As noted above   adverse selection is a major contributor to the problem. Adverse selection can   more appropriately be called cherry picking or "Pass The Trash".
  
   A quick look at the   following tables shows further intent of originators to "Pass The Trash"
  
   
 
   The   above table shows that a whopping 84.1% of subprime (trash by definition) was   securitized.
  
   Of prime mortgages, 22.4% were securitized and a mere 9.3%   remains in bank portfolios. 59.3% is in the portfolios of the GSEs (Fannie Mae,   Freddie Mac).
  
   The Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) can help borrowers   whose loans sit with the GSEs, but only up to 125% of the loan, and even then   only for those who haven’t been more than 30-days late on your mortgage payment   in the last 12 months.
  
   Pray tell what percentage is that?
  
   Substantial Losses Coming
  
   Bloomberg is   reporting ‘Substantial’ Bank Losses Are Needed to Fix Housing 
 
Banks will need to take “substantial” writedowns on home-equity loans to enable loan modifications that will allow the U.S. housing market to recover, according to Amherst Securities Group LP.
The government’s mortgage-modification program will fail to avert many of the 9 million to 10 million looming foreclosures because it doesn’t reduce principal for borrowers, about a quarter of whom owe more than the current values of their houses, Laurie Goodman, a New York-based mortgage-bond analyst at Amherst, said today in a Bloomberg Radio interview.
“It’s important to realize the largest second-lien holders are the largest banks, and there’s going to have to be some very substantial writedowns if you go to a principal-reduction program,” Goodman said. “And this is going to have to be addressed head-on.”
Bond investors such as BlackRock Inc. and Fortress Investment Group LLC have criticized the treatment of home-equity loans under the Obama administration’s $75 billion Home Affordable program, citing in part the potential conflicts of interest that banks such as Wells Fargo & Co. and Bank of America Corp. have in acting as both first-mortgage servicers and owners of second-lien debt.
Through November, U.S. lenders permanently modified 31,382 of as many as 4 million mortgages targeted by the Home Affordable program, the Treasury said Dec. 10. As many as half of “at-risk” homeowners have second mortgages, the department said in April.
U.S. banks held $855 billion of home-equity debt, including closed-end second mortgages and amounts drawn from revolving credit lines, as of Sept. 30, according to Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. data.
Conflicts Of   Interest
  
  $855 billion is a lot of conflict and a lot of   interest.
  
  Don't Expect   Help
  
  Given the conditions on HARP, the cherry picking of prime   loans by the lenders, the huge amounts of negative equity on loans made during   the boom, and second mortgage conflict of interest situations, one should not be   surprised to see lots of people complaining about not being   helped.
  
  Moreover, the harsh reality is neither the Fed nor the Treasury   cares much if the securitized loans blow up. Those securitized loans are sitting   in the hands of pension plans, hedge funds, foreign and domestic investors, and   the hands of other fools that bought the trash.
  
  Securitized loans are a   problem for investors not banks, except of course for home equity lines of   credit sitting on top of the mortgage, creating additional problems for banks   (and for anyone expecting the bank to work out a deal for them).
  
  If you   are underwater or securitized, or if you have a home equity line, you are likely   screwed. If you need help you are not going to get it. That especially applies   to anyone whose mortgage exceeds 125% of home value.
  
  Help Yourself
  
  If you are underwater,   securitized, and screwed, why not help yourself?
  
  A Christmas Jingle can   explain how.
  
  
  
  Those wanting a non-seasonal tune can   sing
  
  50 Ways To Leave Your   Mortgage
  
  "The problem is all inside your head", she said to   me
  The answer is easy if you take it logically
  I'd like to help you in   your struggle to be free
  There must be fifty ways to leave your   mortgage
  
  Just remember ... Before Walking Away Consult An Attorney
  
  One final point   ... Don't place all the blame on the lenders. Individual greed was certainly a   big part of this problem. However, individuals have every right to do what is in   their best interest right here, right now, and that includes walking away.
 By Mike "Mish" Shedlock 
  http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com 
  
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 Mike Shedlock / Mish is a registered investment advisor representative for SitkaPacific Capital Management . Sitka Pacific is an asset management firm whose goal is strong performance and low volatility, regardless of market direction. 
  
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 I do weekly podcasts every Thursday on HoweStreet  and a brief 7 minute segment on Saturday on CKNW AM 980  in Vancouver. 
  
  When not writing about stocks or the economy I spends a great deal of time on photography and in the garden. I have over 80 magazine and book cover credits. Some of my Wisconsin and gardening images can be seen at MichaelShedlock.com . 
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