U.S. Housing Market Foreclosure Prevention Tactics Useless
Housing-Market / US Housing Sep 19, 2009 - 03:58 PM GMTBy: Mike_Shedlock
 An interesting report in the Los Angeles Times shows that a person with   super-prime credit scores is more likely to walk away from an underwater   mortgage than a person with a subprime credit rating.
An interesting report in the Los Angeles Times shows that a person with   super-prime credit scores is more likely to walk away from an underwater   mortgage than a person with a subprime credit rating.
 Inquiring minds are   reading Homeowners who 'strategically default' on loans a growing   problem.
Inquiring minds are   reading Homeowners who 'strategically default' on loans a growing   problem.Who is more likely to walk away from a house and a mortgage -- a person with super-prime credit scores or someone with lower scores?
Research using a massive sample of 24 million individual credit files has found that homeowners with high scores when they apply for a loan are 50% more likely to "strategically default" -- abruptly and intentionally pull the plug and abandon the mortgage -- compared with lower-scoring borrowers.
Among researchers' findings are these eye-openers:
- The number of strategic defaults is far beyond most industry estimates -- 588,000 nationwide during 2008, more than double the total in 2007. They represented 18% of all serious delinquencies that extended for more than 60 days in last year's fourth quarter.
- Strategic defaulters often go straight from perfect payment histories to no mortgage payments at all. This is in stark contrast with most financially distressed borrowers, who try to keep paying on their mortgage even after they've fallen behind on other accounts.
- Strategic defaults are heavily concentrated in negative-equity markets where home values zoomed during the boom and have cratered since 2006. In California last year, the number of strategic defaults was 68 times higher than it was in 2005. In Florida it was 46 times higher. In most other parts of the country, defaults were about nine times higher in 2008 than in 2005.
- Homeowners with large mortgage balances generally are more likely to pull the plug than those with lower balances.
- People who default strategically and lose their houses appear to understand the consequences of what they're doing.
Those set of   facts may at first glance to counterintuitive, if not shocking, but if one   explores the psychology of the situation, one finds it is quite   logical.
  
  Psychology of the Subprime   Strategic Default
  
  The only "asset" many subprime borrowers have is   their home. Although that asset has negative value, the homeowner may have   nowhere else to go, especially if they have to put up a month's rent plus a 1-2   month security deposit in advance to rent.
  
  Someone unable (or unwilling)   to come up with 2-3 month's total rent in advance is stuck. Moreover, even if   the homeowner is able and willing, landlords may screen out poor subprime   prospects in advance.
  
  Also note the psychological factor about "losing the only thing I ever   had".
  
  Finally, even though home may have negative value in a   monetary sense, that home has real value in a practical sense, if the   alternative is being homeless, unable to rent, with no place to   live.
  
  Psychology of the Superprime   Strategic Default
  
  In contrast, the concerns of the superprime   homeowner are vastly different.
  
  Such a person could easily land a rental,   likely has other assets than the home, may have no psychological attachment to   the home, etc.
  
  The primary concerns of the superprime person is more   likely to be the nuisance factor of moving and a credit score hit that for may   be meaningless in a practical sense.
  
  Making Home Affordable Deals
  
  In light of the above, one should   quickly conclude that current foreclosure prevention tactics are unlikely to be   a rousing success.
  
  Indeed, many subprime borrowers are unlikely to   walk-away and superprime homeowners are going to do what they are going to do,   depending on how far underwater they are, as opposed to payment amounts or   interest rates.
  
  The current HAMP (Making Home Affordable) success rate is   12 percent. However, "success" is defined as getting people into the program.   The program is doomed to failure because the effort is concentrated on   temporarily reducing payments and lowering interest rates not on reducing   principle balances.
  
  For more details and analysis on HAMP, please see Foreclosure Filings Top 300,000 for Sixth Straight   Month.
  
  Additional   Links
  
  Calculated Risk mentioned the LA Times Strategic Defaults   article in Report: Strategic Defaults a "Growing Problem" .
  
  CR   comments: "This fits with recent research from   Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales: See New Research on Walking Away and here is their paper: Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on   Mortgages"
  
  Walking   Away
  
  I have talked about walking away dozens of times. Here are a   few of the more recent ones:
  
  Friday, June 05, 2009: Walking Away Revisited - Reader Mailbag - Moral   Dilemma
  
  Sunday, July 26, 2009: Preemptive Defaults
  
  Wednesday, July 29, 2009: Emails from Housing Hypocrites about Ethics
  
  Thursday,   July 30, 2009: Many Chime In On "Housing Hypocrites" Post
  
  Additional Foreclosure Links
  
  Sunday, May   31, 2009: More Prime Foreclosures; More Re-Defaults
  
  Sunday, June   14, 2009: California Foreclosure Moratoriums An Exercise Of   Stupidity
  
  Thursday, July 16, 2009: Foreclosure Filings Hit Record 1.5 Million; One in Eight Americans   Delinquent; Obama's Mortgage Rescues Create ‘Confusion’
  
  Wednesday,   September 16, 2009: "New Rules" Hope to Stave Off Commercial Real Estate   Defaults
  
  Inescapable   Conclusion
  
  The LA Times Article concludes with:
  
  "The Experian-Wyman study does not try to explore the   ethical or legal aspects of mortgage walkaways. But it does suggest that lenders   and loan servicers take steps to screen and identify strategic defaulters in   advance and possibly avoid offering them loan modifications, since they'll   probably just re-default on them anyway."
  
  Judging from the vast   preponderance of evidence presented in the above links, one can conclude that   offering anyone loan modifications is   not likely to do much good except in isolated cases. Indeed, services are   getting paid to modify loans at taxpayer expense, only to have the mortgage   holder walk anyway (or in the case of some subprime loans, not walk away anyway)   .
  
  Still others, out of a job, cannot afford any mortgage payment at   all!
  
  Thus, the total benefit of Home Affordable Programs (as they are   currently structured) is negative. HAMP should be scrapped. Unfortunately, the   most likely thing to happen is Congress will expand the program still further,   wasting even more money.
By Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
Click Here To Scroll Thru My Recent Post List
 Mike Shedlock / Mish is a registered investment advisor representative for SitkaPacific Capital Management . Sitka Pacific is an asset management firm whose goal is strong performance and low volatility, regardless of market direction. 
  
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 I do weekly podcasts every Thursday on HoweStreet  and a brief 7 minute segment on Saturday on CKNW AM 980  in Vancouver. 
  
  When not writing about stocks or the economy I spends a great deal of time on photography and in the garden. I have over 80 magazine and book cover credits. Some of my Wisconsin and gardening images can be seen at MichaelShedlock.com . 
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