Base Metals and Rare Earths Balancing Security of Supply and Investment Optimism
Commodities / Metals & Mining Jan 14, 2010 - 05:30 PM GMT Americans have been bemoaning U.S. dependence on foreign oil for decades and a   domestic alternative still seems a distant dream. Meanwhile, the world has   changed. On one hand, that dependency now stretches across a broadening spectrum   of raw materials, from molybdenum and tungsten to zinc, nickel and chromium to   the decade's darling on the periodic table—the rare earths. And on the other,   huge emerging economies, primarily that of China, are driving up demand for the   raw materials needed to develop infrastructure and making it clear that their   own domestic needs take priority.
Americans have been bemoaning U.S. dependence on foreign oil for decades and a   domestic alternative still seems a distant dream. Meanwhile, the world has   changed. On one hand, that dependency now stretches across a broadening spectrum   of raw materials, from molybdenum and tungsten to zinc, nickel and chromium to   the decade's darling on the periodic table—the rare earths. And on the other,   huge emerging economies, primarily that of China, are driving up demand for the   raw materials needed to develop infrastructure and making it clear that their   own domestic needs take priority. 
That adds up to what mining analyst John   Kaiser describes as "the big theme that underlies the base metals and all the   specialty metals markets"—the concept of security of supply—and it's a global   issue. In this exclusive Energy Report interview, John identifies a few   investment opportunities that are emerging to forestall lack of access to some   key ingredients of economic growth. He also registers a clearly optimistic note   in anticipating "a period of scientific breakthroughs that's going to pump up   the world in a very big way."
  
  The Energy Report: You've   previously discussed security-of-supply concerns in the context of China's   growth. In addition to unloading U.S. paper assets, China is intent on   developing its internal infrastructure to further develop its domestic economy.   So they're taking their U.S.-denominated reserves and solving this   security-of-supply problem by acquiring deposits and assets around the world to   ensure control of key raw materials needed for their long-range   plan.
  
  John Kaiser: Let's back up a bit, because the context is   much broader than that. For nearly 20 years since the collapse of the Soviet   Union, globalization and free markets have allowed producers anywhere in the   world to sell raw materials anywhere they want. But that window seems to be   closing. Supply channels are fragmenting, which will shake the just-in-time   concepts we've become accustomed to. No longer will companies be able—or   willing—to say, "We'll order the raw materials when we need them and pay   whatever it costs."
  
  The worrisome implication is that the future   production from these deposits that the Chinese acquire and develop through   state-owned entities will flow directly back to China and bypass the global   commodity markets. It is often the case that other branches of the Chinese   government will fund infrastructure projects that secure the cooperation of the   host country with regard to mine development and off-take agreements. The recent   deal Afghanistan negotiated with China on its copper deposits is a good example   of a deal that defies the economic logic to which bidders from the western   mining industry must adhere. China is not putting these deposits into production   so that it can make a profit selling the metal output into the commodity   market.
  
  We are shifting to a place where we can't count on molybdenum or   rare earths or nickel or chromium to be available when we need it. So end users   are looking up the supply chain all the way to where the mining industry   normally sits. This is especially the case with the more obscure metals which   are tiny but critical inputs for technology and other goods. They're saying, "We   have to make sure that we have the raw material inputs in place to execute on   our long-term plans, whatever they are." This is one reason why the rare earths   sector has become such a media buzz item—although it's only a $2 billion a year   market at most.
  
  The big theme that underlies the base metals and all the   specialty metals markets is the concept of security of   supply.
  
  TER: Are the insecurities due more to insufficient   supplies or the fact that we can't produce raw materials at a fast enough rate   to satisfy increases in demand?
  
  JK: It's really both. Until the   past year, we had a supply-demand imbalance that began to be felt in 2003, but   the mining industry didn't believe it was real until 2006. By then it was so   well advanced that, because of the three to six years it takes to mobilize new   supply, supply hadn't been able to catch up. Demand hit the wall in 2008. Then,   even though demand didn't pick up all that much last year, base metal prices   bounced back surprisingly well, especially given that the warehouse inventories   for metals such as zinc, nickel and copper are far above their 2006 and 2007   levels. Much of the raw materials that were used during the past decade went   into the construction of infrastructure and productive capacity that will not   generate scrap metal for another couple decades. This is the opposite of what   prevailed during the nineties after the collapse of the Soviet Union when   strategic stockpiles were dumped and Russia's creaky infrastructure was looted   for scrap metal.
  
  TER: So where does that leave us   today?
  
  JK: Two things appear to be happening now. One, end users   or state entities are engaging in long-term strategic stockpiling to make sure   their industries will have raw materials available down the road. Countries such   as China are even engaging in what I call distributed stockpiling. They have   extended credit to thousands of manufacturers, enabling them to buy more metal   than they need. Secondly, low interest rates have created a carry trade that has   resulted in speculators buying raw materials. This makes the situation a bit   precarious because if a rise in interest rates forces speculators to unload all   their investments and flatten out the carry trade, a glut of raw materials may   hit the market and result in a price slump.
  
  TER: With stockpiling   and speculators buying raw materials, why are major companies looking upstream   to secure the supply?
  
  JK: Because of the uncertainty created   during the past two years, the mining industry shelved a lot of projects. In   fact, a lot of the deposits taken over in the last few years are no closer to   production than when they were taken over. So the supply shortage persists. If   the global economy rebounds, an off-take of all this speculative raw material   that's being hoarded would flatten out supplies over the next few   years.
  
  The end user industry is not particularly worried about the near   term. They're far more concerned about what happens five years out and beyond.   For example, there's enough rare earths supply for the next three to five years.   It's what happens down the road, especially if total demand scales up, that has   everybody concerned. Long-range planning needs to be done now and there is now a   strong awareness that some of these materials come from parts of the world that   are potentially unstable.
  
  In addition, we may see the global supply   channels disrupted as the United States and possibly Europe deal with trade   imbalances created by the disparity in cost structures with China. That   disparity prevents the western world from competing in terms of manufactured   goods. A form of protectionism may emerge in which it's not so easy to move   copper or nickel to any point on the planet.
  
  TER: Will   protectionism take the form of trade embargos or import taxes so that goods or   resources from China are priced similar to what we pay in the   U.S.?
  
  JK: Globalization and free market theory say the   old-fashioned tariff system to allow domestic industry to be competitive with   cheaper imported goods is bad because it makes everything expensive for   everybody, but we now find ourselves in an anomalous situation. Part of the   world with a very large population spent a good part of the past century trapped   in a communist rut and ended up with a fairly low standard of living. Now, all   of a sudden they throw off half the trappings of communism and start competing   with the rest of the world on sort of capitalist terms.
  
  The wrinkle is   that they're doing it from an enormous cost advantage in the form of an   abundance of people willing to work for very low wages in a setting where health   and safety costs are minimal. They also deal with very little in terms of   emission controls, which is the complete opposite of what has evolved in the   western world. Finally, because China is a new type of central command economy   that outsources production, its ability to make things happen at home and abroad   is not constrained by free market principles. Of course, businesses always move   production to wherever they can get it done the cheapest. In terms of very, very   cheap goods being available in the western world, this has enhanced our standard   of living. But in the process, it has hollowed out our industrial base, shifted   us into more of a service economy and accumulated a massive trade deficit which   is not sustainable in the long run.
  
  TER: So what are the   options?
  
  JK: There are no happy options. If we throw up big   tariffs, the cost of everything will go way up. If we bully the Chinese into   allowing their currency to rise against the U.S. dollar, everything will become   more expensive as well, but we'd at least be able to justify building factories   again. What I think will happen is that the concern about fossil fuel dependency   and climate change, and the resulting interest in changing the energy   infrastructure in much of the world, will give rise to rules that say we do not   want goods subsidized by processes that harm the environment, such as is   happening in China.
  
  TER: Another form of   protectionism.
  
  JK: Yes, green protectionism. It's a different type   of protectionism that encourages the relocation of manufacturing capacity back   to places like the United States and restores viable long-term economies.   Although it will further fragment global trade, it is my view that some sort of   green-based protectionism will be the strategy to deploy over the next three to   five years.
  
  KR: Will that be a government strategy or a grassroots   strategy?
  
  JK: It's not going to be ground up from the people   because everybody will always want to buy the cheapest good available. Sure, a   small percentage will go to the green store and buy more expensive clothing made   in an environmentally sound manner, but the majority will still go down to   Wal-Mart and, of course, Wal-Mart sources its goods in the lowest-cost   jurisdiction in the world. That's not going to change.
  
  So it has to be a   top-down legislative strategy, but it also has to be developed and implemented   very carefully. Doing it too abruptly would pull the rug out from under China.   We want to level the playing field, but nobody wants to see China implode. Even   in strictly economic terms, we need China's large population (and India's) to   become consumers of the kinds of goods that westerners take for granted. The   obvious hope is that an emerging middle class in China will erode the   competitive advantage of the China Price, but my concern is that this will not   happen fast enough to salvage western economies and keep smaller emerging   economies alive. I see green protectionism, possibly implemented in the form of   a transportation distance tax, as a transitional measure that offsets the cost   structure disparity.
  
  TER: But all the alternatives you   offered—bullying the Chinese to decouple the currency, put tariffs in or   implement green protectionism—would increase prices in the short   term.
  
  JK: Yes. We're facing a period of relative wealth deflation.   The era of consumption that we became accustomed to during the past decade—with   the help of consumer debt and mortgages we couldn't afford and so on—has come to   an end. The last year has been absolutely miserable for a lot of people. They   are in the process of adjusting to a new reality, which will be a lower   consumption footprint. This does not mean Americans will become as poor as the   average Chinese citizen, whose standard of living is on an improvement track.   Having a lower consumption footprint need not be a bad thing if people learn to   view their standard of living in terms of quality of life rather than   quantity.
  
  TER: Even in an era of wealth deflation, where do you   see opportunities for investment and wealth creation in light of these themes   you've been talking about?
  
  JK: The area that has fascinated me   particularly in the past year has been the rare earths. A lot of the   functionality of green technologies, in fact, depends on the addition of these   elements. The security of supply problem with the rare earths is that in the   last 20 years, China has emerged as the overwhelmingly dominant supplier. In   part, it's because they have an abundance of such raw materials, but it's also   partly because they extract them under conditions that are not acceptable in the   West. Combining that supply situation with their low-cost structure has enabled   the Chinese to marginalize rare earth deposits everywhere else.
  
  Yet we   talk about electrifying the car industry. We talk about turbine technology   providing wind power. We talk about creating huge fields of solar panels. If all   of this becomes reality, demand for rare earths will scale up dramatically,   maybe 10-fold over the next 10 to 20 years. So the end users are saying, "Oh,   boy, we're dependent on China." China itself has come out saying they need to do   these things too because they have lousy coal reserves and a minimal oil reserve   base. They're making noises about making sure domestic needs are taken care of   first, which creates a problem in the western world. If we want to build our   wind turbines and hybrid cars, we better secure a raw material supply that   cannot be commandeered and used for national policy purposes.
  
  So we're   scrambling to get the rare earths deposits we found decades ago into production,   so that raw material inputs are available for the plans of the western countries   to transform to a more green-based energy infrastructure.
  
  TER: Are   there some specific companies involved in this scramble that interest   you?
  
  JK: I've actually created an index of about 14 companies in   that space. One in which I have a personal investment is Quest   Uranium Corporation (TSX-V:QUC). They've done sufficient drilling at their   Strange Lake deposit in northern Quebec this past summer to outline a very   significant deposit. It's world-class in size, reasonable grade, and has a full   distribution of all the rare earths metals, from lights to heavies. I suspect   perhaps even a consortium of end users will end up acquiring this project and   developing it almost like a private rare earths warehouse.
  
  TER:   Any others?
  
  JK: Rare   Element Resources Ltd. (TSX.V:RES) has the Bear Lodge deposit in Wyoming and Ucore   Uranium (UCU:TSX.V) has the Bokan deposit near Ketchikan in Alaska. They're   not huge in the sense that the Strange Lake deposit is. Bear Lodge is a fairly   good grade light rare earths deposit and the Bokan project is more dominated by   the heavy rare earths. The USGS actually spent a bunch of money documenting the   nature of the Bokan deposit in the late '80s when we were still concerned about   where the Soviet Union was going with its policies.
  
  Both Bear Lodge and   Bokan are very interesting because the U.S. government is now investigating its   own security of supply for the rare earths through the RESTART bill. The   military in particular—which spends a good portion of its $600 billion annual   budget on hardware—has awakened to the fact that some functionality of its   critical hardware depends on rare earths inputs that now come only from China.   Some consortium of defense contractors could end up taking over these projects   and developing them as small-scale mines. They'd use government funded R&D   to figure out process technology for getting these elements out of the mineral   assemblages within which they are embedded, and probably share that technology   with the private sector so other deposits can be developed to ensure the   commercial market also has a supply as well from other rare earth deposits   outside of China.
  
  TER: Except for Rare Element Resources, the   companies you mentioned are obviously involved in uranium as well as rare   earths. What's your outlook for uranium?
  
  JK: Quest and Ucore both   started as uranium exploration juniors. Because rare earth deposits can occur in   geological settings conducive for uranium deposits, it is natural for   open-minded geologists to recognize the rare earth potential of certain   projects. Both companies have now shifted their focus to rare earths. I think   the uranium sector will make a comeback in 2010. Uranium prices went way up in   the past five years because it is very difficult to get new uranium supply on   stream and we had a temporary spot market shortage. We now see uranium in the   $40 to $50 range and it might increase $10 to $20 or so longer-term.
  
  The   hope is that the Obama administration warms up to the idea that nuclear energy   is an excellent carbon-free source of electricity. The Chinese have lots of   uranium-based nuclear power reactors on the drawing board, but they are also   looking at thorium, another candidate for nuclear energy but without the   weapons-making capability. I don't see demand for uranium going through the roof   the way it can for the rare earths. The difference between uranium and the rare   earths sectors is uranium essentially has two uses. One is to make nuclear   weapons, and we really don't want demand to go up there. The other is for   nuclear power, and that demand can be quantified quite well in   advance.
  
  In contrast, the rare earths have a wild demand dynamic because   ongoing R&D keeps coming up with ways to work with these elements'   interesting properties. All kinds of technologies already exist that can't even   be commercialized because there's not a sufficient supply of these rare earths   in existence.
  
  As the additional rare earth deposits get into production,   the logical economic objection is that all this new supply will glut the market.   But not in this case. As the supply becomes available, end users will have the   confidence to commercialize applications with functionality superior to prior   applications, so I would expect the supply to actually be readily   absorbed.
  
  Not only that, you also will see a scramble to make more   efficient use of these rare earths, particularly if China stops subsidizing the   cost structure of rare earth production and allows the price to rise. There's   something called Jevons paradox that drives the scarcity people crazy; namely,   in response to scarce supply of a raw material, you engage in R&D to   increase the efficiency of its usage and as a result total demand for it   actually goes up. This would not apply to uranium because of its limited uses,   but it would certainly apply to rare earths and other technology   metals.
  
  I think we are on the frontier of a material science boom coming   on the heels of three decades dominated by information and biotechnology booms.   An awful lot of money, both from the private sector and government, will go   toward seeing if we can push elements to do far more than has ever been done   before. One area is, of course, efficiency and durability. But another area is   emerging as the new Holy Grail. If you can produce energy at a lower per-unit   cost than the current norm, and the "fuel" for doing so is readily available,   you will give the world a massive boost in its overall wealth or standard of   living. The United States has excelled in that regard in the past and could   excel again and buy itself another 20 to 30 years of leadership in the   world.
  
  TER: So you feel that the U.S. should focus on the R&D   specifically related to energy?
  
  JK: Absolutely. As we all know,   one of the biggest problems with renewable energy such as solar and wind is that   those are intermittent sources. You need incredible capacity to provide a   baseload supply, which naturally increases the per-unit cost of the electricity   produced. One answer is battery storage capacity. If you compare this issue to   computer memory, I was just reading where one terabyte of storage capacity—which   10 years ago cost $1 million to produce, today costs only $100. Why don't we   have a battery that can very efficiently and safely store a massive amount of   electricity? A battery that can do that when the wind is blowing hard and the   sun is cooking hot is the Manhattan Project of the future. The R&D that goes   into this will likely have many other spinoffs as they really push all these   materials to the limit.
  
  I think we're entering a period of scientific   breakthroughs that's going to pump up the world in a very big way. One of my   hopes for the new decade is that we enter a whole new world of scientific   developments that give us back a sense of optimism.
  
  TER: While   you're envisioning this next decade, have you found some companies that are   starting to excel in those areas?
  
  JK: That's not an area that I   read a lot about, but a lot is always going on in Silicon Valley. And, of   course, China's goal is to eclipse the United States as the technological   leader. They have a reputation for stealing technology, but they have reached   the critical mass where they are saying they have to do it internally. They have   surplus capital available to fund R&D and are pouring enormous effort into   it. China is not a hotbed of private innovation because it has weak intellectual   property rights. But it does have an abundance of scientists, many of them   trained in western universities, who are being recruited to conduct pure   research funded by the state.
  
  TER: So it's a   race.
  
  JK: Yes, it's a technology race. The United States, Europe   and Japan need to stay on top of it.
  
  TER: Any more thoughts in   terms of investment opportunities on the scarcity of supply and green   protectionism themes?
  
  JK: Cliffs   Natural Resources Inc. (NYSE:CLF) , which supplies the U.S. steel-making   industry with coking coal and iron ore pellets, recently made a $250 million   takeover bid for Freewest Resources Canada Inc. (TSX-V: FWR), whose primary   asset is a chromite deposit in northern Ontario. This is regarded as a very   strange event because South Africa and Kazakhstan currently supply all of the   world's chromium for making stainless steel. The northern Ontario deposits are   not as high-grade as South Africa's, yet Cliffs is paying $250 million and will   need to invest up to $2 billion to bring this deposit to production. A lot of   people wonder why.
  
  Well, Cliffs is deploying strategic logic in place of   economic logic. It's looking ahead of the curve, anticipating a supply   disruption in South Africa and making an investment now to ensure being able to   supply the U.S. with all the chromium its steelmaking industry needs.
  
  And   this same company just did a deal with First   Point Minerals Corp. (TSX-V:FPX), which came up with an innovative concept   of mining low-grade nickel in very large deposits in British Columbia where the   nickel occurs in a form called nickel iron alloy. This form of nickel does not   have the energy- and chemical-intensive separation costs of nickel laterite and   sulphite deposits. First Point in the process of tying up similar deposits   around the world.
  
  So here's a fairly cheap company with out-of-the-box   thinking in terms of security of supply. I'm guessing that Cliffs may end up   also buying it out down the road because its gamble is that energy costs—and as   a result, nickel costs—will go up. But because it controls a supply of nickel   whose cost structure will not rise with the rising cost of energy, it will stand   to benefit.
  
  TER: Those are great examples. Any others?
  
  JW: Lithic   Resources Ltd. (TSX-V: LTH) comes to mind. It's trading around 30 cents and   its market cap is only $15 million and it's entering the next stage of   development work on a deposit in Utah. There are not many zinc mines in the U.S.   Zinc has been out of favor for a very long time, but it's going to do very well   in the next couple of years. Because zinc has been such a dog metal, not a lot   of new supply has been developed, and in 2011 a large number of major zinc mines   will shut down as a result of depletion.
  
  Lithic Resources has a special   wrinkle, too. Its deposit in Utah has a fairly high grade of indium in it.   That's another specialty metal used in flat panel displays and certain types of   solar cell. To commercialize those solar cells will require a lot more indium   supply. So here's a hybrid situation where if they develop this deposit, they   probably will get a better zinc price down the road and also produce indium as a   byproduct. Because this deposit has only about $4 billion worth of metal in the   ground, it's regarded as kind of small, but the contained indium is enough for   almost two years of total world demand. Such a company becomes a potential   target for an end user who wants security of supply for   indium.
  
  TER: We're back to the security of supply issue   again.
  
  JK: There will be a lot of interest in seeing base metal   mines developed in the U.S. to minimize dependence on raw materials mined   elsewhere in the world. It is worth noting that China, the biggest supplier of   zinc, is now a net importer. China has emerged as a net importer of molybdenum   and tungsten, too, for which we've also had a long-term dependency on China. So   long-held assumptions about where these materials will come from in the future   have to be re-thought.
  
  TER: Are you following any other security   of supply stories?
  
  JK: Amazon   Mining Holding Plc (TSX-V:AMZ) is in the process of demonstrating that a   potash deposit in southern Brazil, which is lower grade than the traditional   potassium chloride mined in places such as Saskatchewan, can be of economic   value in the special circumstances of southern Brazil. The combination of acid   soils and torrential rains there reduces the efficiency of traditional   chloride-based potassium because it dissolves too quickly in that type of soil.   The type of deposit Amazon is working with is a silicate deposit called   glauconite, which is lower grade and does not dissolve as easily; but as a   result it also has a higher, more energy-intensive processing cost. In 2008 they   staked a huge swath of land where this stuff sits at surface, so they avoid the   high extraction costs that underground mining of the Saskatchewan deposits   entail.
  
  Glauconite was discovered in the '80s but shelved because it was   so much cheaper to use imported potash. Brazil currently imports 90% of its   potash fertilizer needs, and agriculture is a huge part of its economy. Now with   concerns about global potash demand and rising demand for its agricultural   products, the Brazilian government is supporting this company's work.
  
  We   should know in about six months where this project stands. If they can   demonstrate that this source is more efficient in terms of providing nutrients   that the plants need and can absorb and that the cost is reasonably constrained,   this company with a current market cap of $50 million or $60 million will become   the linchpin for a multi-billion dollar agricultural industry. A company like   this will end up being absorbed at a much higher price than its current $2   trading range.
  
  TER: So is the key factor the effectiveness of the   potash as a fertilizer or being able to mine it economically?
  
  JK:   It's both. But it's also a security-of-supply issue. It's creating a domestic   alternative to imported potash. Even if it costs a bit more, it's in the   interest of Brazil's agricultural sector to offset its dependence on foreign   sources.
  
  John Kaiser, a mining analyst with 25-plus years of   experience, produces the Kaiser Bottom-Fish Report. It specializes in high-risk   Canadian resource sector securities and seeks to provide investors with a   framework for intelligent speculation. His investment approach integrates his   "bottom-fishing strategy" with his "rational speculation model." After   graduating from the University of British Columbia in 1982, John joined   Continental Carlisle Douglas, a Vancouver brokerage firm that specialized in   Vancouver Stock Exchange listed securities, as a research assistant. Six years   later, he moved to Pacific International Securities as research director and   also became a registered investment adviser. Not long after moving to the U.S.   with his family in 1994, John cast his own line in the water, so to speak, with   publication of the premier edition of the Kaiser Bottom-Fish   Report.
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DISCLOSURE:
1) Karen Roche, of The Energy Report, conducted   this interview. She personally and/or her family own none of the companies   mentioned in this interview.
2) None of the companies mentioned in the   interview are sponsors of The Energy Report.
3) Keith Schaefer—I personally   and/or my family own the following companies mentioned in this interview: West,   Petrominerales, Bankers, Painted Pony. I personally and/or my family am paid by   none of the companies mentioned in this interview. 
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